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19 July 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Republic of the Congo: Brussels' stated intention to ignore Premier Lumumba's ultimatum to remove its troops from the Congo may lead to a formal Congolese request for Soviet assistance. Lumumba's freedom of action, however, appears to be checked by opposition in the Congo Senate to any Soviet "interference" in the Congo, and by the action of Belgian troops in yielding their security responsibilities to UN forces in some areas. UN representative Bunche in Leopoldville reports that he had great difficulty in convincing Lumumba that UN forces would not be turned over to him to use against the Belgians, and characterized Lumumba as "crazy."

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Turkey: The provisional government of Turkey plans to retire many senior officers of the armed forces and has requested US financial support for the program. While reform in Turkey's military personnel management practices is badly needed and should remove much "deadwood," summary retirement of large numbers of senior officers could increase political ferment in the country and result in some damage to the military establishment.

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X1 [Cambodia: Chief of State Sihanouk continues to threaten, in speeches and articles, to seek Communist bloc military aid unless the United States meets his demands--which have not yet been formally presented--for more and better armaments.]

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25X1 Ceylon: The 20 July national elections are unlikely to resolve the political stalemate produced by the elections last March. Again neither major party seems capable of winning a majority in parliament. Support for the moderately socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) does not appear to have dropped substantially since March, and the party will benefit from a no-contest agreement with two leftist parties. The relatively conservative United National party has made good use of several key issues, however, and should be able at least to hold the slim plurality it won in March. If the SLFP again comes in a close second, with leftist support it probably could command a larger parliamentary coalition with which to form a government.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation in the Congo

Brussels' stated intention to ignore Premier Lumumba's ultimatum to withdraw Belgian troops from the Congo may lead to a formal Congolese request for Soviet intervention. The Belgians continue to airlift reinforcements to the Congo, and while Belgian troops have yielded to UN authority in certain areas of Leopoldville Province, they have shown no disposition either to leave the country or to withdraw to Belgian bases there.

Although Lumumba has threatened to request Soviet "intervention" on 19 July, there are indications that members of his government are emerging from their recent shock and are concerned over the present course of events. On 18 July, the Congo Senate adopted a resolution opposing Lumumba's ultimatum to the Belgians and rejecting any Soviet interference in the Congo. Opposition to Lumumba appears likely to increase as the present trend toward political fragmentation continues.

In Katanga Province, which has declared itself independent of the Congo, Premier Tshombé has formally requested recognition from the UN and from various Western states. [It is possible that his anti-Lumumba regime will be recognized by Portugal and supported by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.] Belgium is reluctant to accord precipitate recognition to Katanga lest it be accused of establishing a puppet state in its erstwhile colony. Should any other country recognize Katanga, however, Brussels would probably follow suit.

There is no confirmation to date of Tshombé's claims that the Congo's Kivu and Kasai provinces will affiliate with Katanga. In these and in Leopoldville Province, however, further secessionist moves are possible.

[Meanwhile, UN representative Ralph Bunche in Leopoldville reports that he had great difficulty in convincing Lumumba that UN forces would not be turned over to him to use against the Belgians, and characterized Lumumba as "crazy."] UN officials in the Congo have recommended that UN troop strength, now approximately 5,000, should be brought to 10,000 as soon as possible, while UN headquarters in New York hopes to move a Swedish battalion to the Congo in order to allay the misgivings of Congo Europeans concerning the arrival so far of only African contingents of the UN force.

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Bulk of Turkey's Senior Military Officers Face
Forced Retirement

[The provisional government of Turkey, in a move prompted by the National Unity Committee (NUC), plans to retire 2,000-3,000 generals and field-grade officers. Rumors of the proposed forced retirement program already are reported causing unrest in the officer corps.]

25X1 [Turkey's military personnel management practices, which for years have allowed an accumulation of deadwood in top ranks, have been badly in need of reform. Summary retirement of the large number proposed, however, could increase political ferment throughout Turkey and result in some damage to the military establishment. The procedure would undoubtedly result in the dismissal of some able officers, as the Turkish armed forces lack an effective personnel evaluation system. Ambassador Warren has noted that the proposed step could be no more than a move to complete the revolutionary process of the "colonels coup" and ensure that NUC members are left in effective control of the military forces.]

[The high level and unusual intensity of the Turkish approaches to American officials on the retirement plan indicate the importance Ankara attaches to it. General Gursel, chairman of the NUC and interim chief of state, accompanied by his top adviser, Colonel Turkes, and by Foreign Minister Sarper, made a strong appeal for American financial support. Gursel was highly critical of the military goals of the former regime and claimed that, if the present government spent the amount required to meet them, Turkey would become "an army without a country."]

[The ambassador cautions that future Turkish decisions on other phases of Turkish-American relations, including current and contemplated US requests for defense facilities, could be influenced by the American reaction to the current approach. He further noted that Turkish leaders are apparently determined to go ahead with the retirement program, and that, if the American response is negative, the chances of influencing future military personnel policies would probably be very slight.]

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Sihanouk Continues Criticism of American Military Aid

Chief of State Sihanouk, in speeches and newspaper articles, is continuing his propaganda campaign of invective against alleged shortcomings in American military aid to Cambodia. In a violent speech on 14 July in the northwestern provincial center of Siem Reap, Sihanouk reiterated his threat to accept proffered Communist bloc military aid if the United States does not meet what he claims to be Cambodia's defense needs.

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The Cambodian Government thus far has not formalized Sihanouk's demands for more and better American arms, although it has indicated that preliminary talks would begin soon in Phnom Penh and that Lon Nol would be coming to Washington later for further negotiations.

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Ceylon's National Elections Unlikely to Resolve Long-Standing Political Stalemate

Ceylon's national elections on 20 July are unlikely to resolve the political stalemate which resulted from the elections last March, since once again no single party seems capable of winning a majority. The two leading contenders are closely balanced, and no last-minute issue has developed which would set a distinct election trend. The relatively conservative United National party (UNP) seems to hold a slight lead, however, and should maintain the four-seat plurality it won over the moderate-socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) last March.

The UNP's efforts to exploit Singhalese-Buddhist nationalism and to expose the role of international as well as local Communism in Ceylon have kept the opposition on the defensive throughout the campaign. The much-publicized meeting in mid-June between two local Trotskyite leaders and the Soviet ambassador has recently become the UNP's chief weapon against the SLFP. Press speculation that the SLFP's electoral pact with the Trotskyite and orthodox Communist parties is merely the traditional first step in Marxist strategy for seizing power may have aroused latent suspicion of Communist intentions. While it is not clear whether enough voters are aware of this issue to affect election trends, some 200 people in Colombo demonstrated against the Soviet Embassy on 12 July, demanding the ambassador's return to Moscow.

However, support for the SLFP does not appear to have dropped substantially since March. Moreover, the party should benefit from its no-contest agreement with the two leftist parties. If the SLFP again ranks a close second, with leftist support it probably could command a larger parliamentary coalition than the UNP. SLFP President Mrs. Bandaranaike reportedly indicated recently that she would not object to having Trotskyite party leader N. M. Perera join an SLFP government. This reverses earlier denials that the party would cooperate with the Marxists after the elections.

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